Anonymous Social Networks versus Peer Networks in Restaurant Choice by Tiwari, Ashutosh (Author) et al.
Anonymous Social Networks versus Peer Networks in Restaurant Choice  
by 
Ashutosh Tiwari 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Science  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved July 2013 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Timothy Richards, Chair  
Yueming Qiu 
Carola Grebitus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
August 2013  
i 
ABSTRACT  
   
I compare the effect of anonymous social network ratings (Yelp.com) and peer 
group recommendations on restaurant demand.  I conduct a two-stage choice experiment 
in which restaurant visits in the first stage are informed by online social network reviews 
from Yelp.com, and visits in the second stage by peer network reviews.  I find that 
anonymous reviewers have a stronger effect on restaurant preference than peers.  I also 
compare the power of negative reviews with that of positive reviews.  I found that 
negative reviews are more powerful compared to the positive reviews on restaurant 
preference.  More generally, I find that in an environment of high attribute uncertainty, 
information gained from anonymous experts through social media is likely to be more 
influential than information obtained from peers.    
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Food Away From Home (FAFH) constitutes a major share of the household food budget, 
and yet we know very little about why some restaurants succeed, and others fail.  Fully 
26 % of the restaurants fail within the first year, and around 50 % within the first three 
years (Parsa et al. 2005).  Restaurants seem to be either extremely successful or they 
struggle to survive, which suggests that there is some form of non-linearity or bandwagon 
effect driving restaurant demand (Becker 1991).  Banerjee (1992), Cai, Chen, and Fang 
(2009), and Anderson and Magruder (2012) each find that diners rely on information 
derived from social networks to inform restaurant choices.  Social learning, in turn, 
implies a “social multiplier” effect that would explain the observed bi-modal nature of 
restaurant success (Manski 1993, 2000).  In this study, I use experimental methods to test 
for social learning effects in a restaurant environment.  
  Restaurant meals embody multiple attributes, many of which are either 
experience or credence attributes in the sense of Nelson (1974).  As such, consumers face 
considerable a priori uncertainty in choosing where to go.  Consumers face uncertainty 
regarding not only  the food offered in the restaurant, but the overall dining experience as 
restaurant meals are archetypical multi-attribute experiences.  Attributes such as food 
taste, food quality, ambiance, service quality, location of the restaurant, menu choices 
and price, all contribute to the overall dining experience.  Diners face uncertainty when 
they have limited or no prior experience when choosing among available restaurants.  To 
resolve this uncertainty, diners seek various sources of information, which include both 
marketer-controlled and marketer-uncontrolled sources.  
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Marketer-uncontrolled sources such as word-of-mouth (WOM) are generally 
more credible and influential than marketer-controlled sources such as paid advertising 
(Buttle, 1998; Mangold et al., 1999; Buda and Zhang, 2000).  It is well-understood  that 
word of mouth (WOM) has a strong effect on consumer decision making process (Herr, 
Kardes and Kim 1991; Maxham 2001; De Bruyn and Lilien 2008), but traditional WOM 
takes place in small social groups and the conversations are ephemeral (Hu and Li 2011).  
In the last decade, increasing user-based online interaction has eliminated some of the 
limitations of traditional peer-to-peer communication, and yet has created a sharper 
distinction between WOM in peer and anonymous networks.  
There are two categories of online social networks: peer networks and anonymous 
networks.  In peer networks every member is connected to other members by a primary 
connection (friend), secondary connection (friend’s friend) or tertiary connection 
(secondary friend’s friend) and so on.  Watts and Strogatz (1998) show that there is a 
maximum of six degrees of separation in any peer network -- a phenomenon known as 
the “small world” effect.   Examples of online peer networks are Facebook, Linkedin, 
Twitter and Instagram.  Anonymous networks consist of online communities, where 
members are past users of different products services, who share their experiences with 
other members.  Yelp, Tripadvisor and Citiguide are examples of few popular anonymous 
networks.  In this study, I compare the relative effect of each type of WOM in driving the 
demand for restaurants.  More generally, I study the role of both anonymous social media 
and social peer networks in shaping trends in FAFH demand, which often portend more 
general changes in food consumption.    
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Peer and anonymous WOM differ in several important ways.  While peer 
networks have a trust advantage over anonymous networks (Hilligoss and Rieh 2008), 
anonymous networks include a far deeper well of knowledge, and different perspectives 
that may be valuable for potential customers (Cheung and Lee 2012).  Web-based 
interaction or electronic word of mouth (e-WOM) can take place among distant 
individuals and, more importantly, does not require individuals to send and receive 
messages at the same time.  Moreover, in most cases the messages are stored in the 
medium and available for a future reference (Bhatnagar and Ghose 2004; Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004; Duan, Gu and Whinston 2008).  At the same time, consumers rely on peer 
networks for similar information on services they may have limited experience with.   
With the rise of web 2.0 technology in the last decade and its two way interactive power, 
online social networking is a ubiquitous phenomenon.
1
  While peer social networking 
websites such as Facebook.com, Twitter.com, Myspace.com, and Instagram.com enable 
customers to obtain feedback and recommendations for products and services based on 
peer user experiences, anonymous networking websites such as Yelp.com, 
Traveladvisor.com and CitiGuide.com use customer reviews to disseminate e-WOM.  
Which category of social networks, anonymous or peer, is more effective in increasing 
demand, therefore is an empirical question.   
Empirical social learning effects are well-documented in investment decisions 
(Hong, Kubic and Stein, 2004), new product purchase (Mayzlin 2006, Godes and 
                                               
1 Web 2.0 is the newer version of World Wide Web that enables two way interaction and user created 
content unlike its predecessor, Web 1.0 (Lia and Turban, 2008). These two features are of prime 
importance to induce the existence and proliferation of online social networks.  
 
4 
Mayzlin 2004, 2009) and retirement plan participation (Duflo and Saez 2002, 2003).  
Reviews and recommendations from members of a consumer’s peer network have a 
strong impact on choice (Narayan, Rao and Sanders 2011; Cai, Chen and Fang 2009; 
Trusov, Bodapati and Bucklin 2010).  These studies, however, focus on peer networking 
and not anonymous social networks.  Anderson and Magruder (2012), on the other hand, 
show that positive ratings from anonymous Yelp reviewers can raise the apparent demand 
for restaurants, but they do not compare the value of anonymous and peer networks to 
consumers and, thereby, to restaurant owners.  I aim to compare the relative effect of 
each type of social network on demand, and quantify the importance of each in driving 
restaurant success or failure.  
The lack of research comparing peer and anonymous social networks is primarily 
due to a lack of data.  While this observation seems paradoxical, given the ubiquity of 
each, the fact that each represents a fundamentally different concept of social learning 
means that there is no source of revealed-demand data from both.  Therefore, I conduct 
an economic experiment to compare the effectiveness of anonymous versus peer 
networks as tools for marketing restaurant meals.  I directly compare the impact of 
publicly available user reviews from a customer review website (Yelp) to that of peer 
reviews on restaurant demand. 
In any empirical model of social learning, identification is always an issue 
because the individual is also part of the group.  Manski (1993) describes this as the 
“reflection problem”:   How can a researcher infer the effect of the group behavior on the 
behavior of an individual, when the individual contributes to some of the observed group 
behavior?  When behavioral effects of a peer group on an individual, who is a peer 
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member of that group herself are modeled, the results obtained are biased. Reflection is 
best mitigated through appropriate controlled experimental design, which generates rich 
data and hence mitigates the reflection problem.  I conduct a two-stage group-subgroup 
experiment under strict uniform network size restrictions to tackle the identification 
problems associated with social learning.  I randomly assign members of each peer-group 
into sub-groups and do not allow peers to decide their subgroup.  Such random 
assignment ensures that peers do not choose subgroups of similar preferences and thus 
correlation between observed peer attributes and the error term in the restaurant choice 
regression equation is limited by design.  Recommendations based on restaurant visits in 
the first-stage by one sub-group are given to members of the other sub-group prior to 
visiting same restaurant.  I then aggregate the data during econometric estimation to 
incorporate group level heterogeneity in a manner similar to Georgi et.al (2007) and 
Bramoullé et.al (2009).  By dividing each peer group into two sub groups, I avoid the 
reflection problem.  
Other than the reflection problem, peer networks are typical to have endogeneity 
problems.  Manski (1993) formed three hypotheses for peers as why they behave in 
similar fashion: 1) endogenous effects, which explain existence of a herd behavior, in that 
peers behave as other members in the peer group, 2) contextual effects, which are 
similarities with respect to the exogenous factors such as similar demographics or 
psychographics within a peer group, and 3) correlated effects, which are similar 
environmental factors under which peers within a network reflect similar behavior.  I 
address endogeneity of network membership through an instrumental-variables 
estimation approach.  Specifically, I estimate social learning effects with an ordered 
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probit model, estimated using a control function approach (Park and Gupta 2009; Petrin 
and Train 2010).  Brock and Durlauf (2002, 2007) demonstrate that peer effects are 
identified in a discrete choice model, even in the presence of correlated effects with 
binary or multinomial choice models.  In this paper, I use an ordered probit model to 
estimate the importance of network effects in restaurant preference because demand is 
expressed in terms of a five-point rating scale measuring whether the consumer would 
visit the restaurant again.   I create full-information adjacency matrices for each group 
that gives us complete information about how well a peer knows other members in the 
same network.  Using this information, along with individual demographic and 
behavioral attributes, I am able to identify peer effects at individual level (Bramoullé, 
Djebbari and Fortin 2009).  
While my experimental design allows us to exclude the individual from the group 
for whom I want to test the peer effect, my control function modelling approach helps me 
handle endogeneity problem.  Combining these two features mean that my experimental 
design and modelling approach is both unique and appropriate to study peer effects.  
I find that information obtained from peer networks has a stronger influence on 
restaurant choice than experts from anonymous social media. Online rating websites 
especially restaurant review websites such as Yelp, contain numerous reviews from the 
past users with detailed user stories and experience.  Despite the large pool of specific 
information about particular restaurants which likely helps decision makers, peer reviews 
are likely more trustworthy source of information and hence influences restaurant choice.  
In most cases peers networks are generally smaller as compared to anonymous networks 
and a small percentage of peers provide information on a single restaurant due to 
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different tastes and preferences within the peer group but yet they likely have more 
influence on other peers in the network.  I also take into account that individuals in the 
peer networks do not have equal influence on other members and, similar to Godes and 
Mayzlin (2009), the most interconnected is not necessarily the most influential 
individual.  Other than interconnectedness, level of influence also depends upon other 
factors such as strength of connections (Weimann, 1983) and communication frequency 
(Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). 
My research has both managerial importance, and a more general contribution in 
providing a better understanding how social media effects demand.  By understanding the 
relative role of peer and social networks, restaurant managers may be able to avoid the 
boom-or-bust dynamic typical of startups in the foodservice industry.  The research may 
also help guide foodservice managers to develop effective online social media marketing 
strategy and helps optimize their marketing budget.  More generally, I identify the 
relative importance of online rating sites to peer networking sites.  To the extent that 
firms in other industries share the same type of uncertainty faced by restaurant owners, 
my findings are suggestive of how social media strategies may be designed for maximum 
effect.  The next section describes a conceptual model that I use to formulate the 
hypotheses that follow from the theory of social learning through peer and anonymous 
networks.  In the third section, I explain the social dining experiment design and 
execution, while fourth section presents the econometric model.  I present the results 
from my econometric model in section five, and conduct a number of specification tests 
to establish the validity of my approach.  Section six summarizes my findings, and 
suggests some limitations.  
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Chapter 2 
ECONOMIC MODEL OF SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS 
Restaurant offerings are fundamentally different than other service offerings as they have 
an aesthetic and emotional component to them (Johns, 1999). Restaurants face a 
challenge to offer variety on their menus and at the same time to standardize the 
experience for the same menu item over time. The restaurant market in the U.S is mature, 
having developed in response to diverse consumer preferences for multiple dining 
options (Mack et.al, 2000).  While the fast food market offers more standardized products 
and services, fine-dining restaurant offerings are generally more complex, each offering a 
unique combination of various desired dining attributes.  Other than the attributes of food 
served, factors such as customers’ sense of style, ambiance and service play vital role in 
diners’ decision making process (Muller and Woods, 1994).  Combination of all these 
observable and unobservable factors makes restaurant offering a complex combination. 
This complexity implies a high degree of uncertainty with respect to quality, or the 
general level of satisfaction with the experience.  Consumers resolve this uncertainty by 
obtaining information.  Among the various sources of information available, word of 
mouth (WOM) is particularly important.   
 Individuals do not live in isolation and are part of various social communities.  
Members of these communities interact during social gatherings, formal or informal 
meetings, social events or even day to day unplanned encounters.  These interactions 
induce a two-way flow of information exchange.  When this information is particular to 
any product or service, it is commonly spread through WOM.  Consumers are more 
receptive to WOM from members of their social networks than other marketer controlled 
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sources of information such as advertisements and promotions (Goldenberg et.al 2009 
and Domingos 2005).  When a consumer dines at a restaurant and then shares her 
experience with other members in the social network, perceptions of, and preferences for,  
the restaurant within the social network will change (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2003; Nam, 
Manchanda, and Chintagunta, 2010).   
 There are two dimensions of WOM effects: magnitude and direction.  The 
magnitude of WOM effect will depend upon influential power and information 
dissemination power of the source within the network, and the strength of his or her 
connection with other members (Dierkes, Bichler and Krishnan, 2011).  The direction of 
WOM, however, depends on the nature of the message.  It is intuitive that positive WOM 
will have a positive effect and negative WOM will have a negative effect on demand, but 
whether the effect is asymmetric is an empirical question.  Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) 
found some evidence that negative reviews have more powerful impact than that of 
positive reviews in case of book reviews using secondary online data.  Richards and 
Patterson (1999) found that negative media reports have a greater effect on prices than 
positive reports after a foodborne disease outbreak in strawberries.  If utility is concave 
(increases at a decreasing rate) in the amount of information received, then the response 
is likely to be asymmetric with negative information providing a larger negative impact 
than positive information provides in the opposite direction.  According to this concave 
utility theory the incremental loss of utility by receiving negative reviews is much more 
than the gain in utility by receiving positive reviews.  If the utility gain by positive 
reviews is defined by Up and the utility loss is defined by Un and these utility levels are 
functions of corresponding positive and negative information provided to the respondents 
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in the form reviews, then according to the concave utility theory, for the same absolute 
value of positive reviews and negative reviews the magnitude of Un and Up will be 
different (see figure 1).
 
Figure-1, Marginal Utility of Positive and Negative Reviews 
Magnitude of Un will be larger than magnitude of Up.  I test this theory using my 
experimental review data.  I incorporate both positive and negative online Yelp reviews 
in my experiment and compare the relative effect each on restaurant demand.   
The power of WOM depends not only on the nature of the message, but the 
source as social network members who disseminate WOM can be either known peers or 
unknown experts.  Within each social network, not every member has an equal effect on 
consumer choice.  In peer networks, those who have strong connections, who frequently 
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communicate with the consumer and who are central to the consumer’s network likely 
have more influence than their counterparts (Weimann 1983; Zenger and Lawrence 1989; 
Ibarra and Andrews 1993).  However, the most connected member is not necessarily the 
most influential as network members vary in their individual persuasiveness (Goldenberg 
et al, 2009).  Similarly, experts with more experience and more followers are likely to be 
viewed as more credible, so may be more influential.  Therefore, finding who is the most 
influential is an econometric problem.  
This experiment is designed to test two hypotheses.  First, peer WOM is more 
influential than WOM from anonymous networks in restaurant choice.  Second, whether 
positive reviews from anonymous social networks have greater marginal impact than 
negative reviews. In the next section I describe the two stage social dining experiment in 
detail. 
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Chapter 3 
THE SOCIAL DINING EXPERIMENT 
To compare the influential power of anonymous and peer networks and to compare the 
relative effect of positive and negative reviews in the case of restaurant choice, I designed 
a two stage experiment.  A two stage model is required to understand the influence of 
information (Urberg et al, 2003).  The experiment allows direct comparison between the 
influences of information from two different sources.  In the first stage information 
provided to the respondents was from anonymous experts and in the second stage the 
information provided was from known peers. Narayan, Rao and Saunders (2011) also 
conducted a two stage experiment to but my experiment is different from theirs in three 
ways.  First they only consider peer effects while I compare the peer and anonymous 
effects. Secondly they follow an attribute influence approach by providing no information 
in stage one and information from peers in stage two.  While I use a control group and 
follow a panel approach in each of the stages.  Lastly I add one more dimension to my 
experiment by classifying the information provided to respondents into positive and 
negative information.     
 As explained by (Manski 1993), social experiments with peer groups are 
susceptible to the reflection problem.  The reflection problem raises the question that, 
how to infer the influence of a group on an individual, when the individual is herself part 
of the group?  My experiment design helps avoid the problem of reflection as I divide 
each peer group into two equal subgroups.  I provide peer reviews from one subgroup to 
the other subgroup and vice versa.  This way the controlled nature of my experiment 
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helps me avoiding the endogeneity problem persistent in the social networks (Jackson, 
2008) and the reflection problem.       
 To test my hypotheses, I conduct a social network dining experiment.  My 
experiment consists of two stages (figure 2).  In the first stage, I recruit 10 individuals to 
serve as “hubs.”  Hubs are individuals who are selected as organizational nodes for each 
network, but are not necessarily the most influential people in each network.  The 
purpose of choosing hubs is to recruit a “friend network” in which I can be assured that 
each individual knows the others to varying degrees.  That is, some members of the 
network organized by the hub may be best friends, while others may be only rare  
 
Figure 2, Two Stage Experiment Outline 
acquaintances.   Each hub was asked to recruit a group of 10 individuals.  These 10 
groups are independent peer networks (the groups are pre-selected to consist of 10 
individuals who know each other and are connected through a primary, secondary or 
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tertiary connection).
2
  Then I randomly divide each peer group into sub-groups of five 
members each:  The “A” subgroup and the “B” subgroup.  In the first stage, “A” 
subgroup members visited a restaurant in Gilbert, AZ for lunch (rated 2.5 stars on Yelp).
3
  
Five A subgroups were provided with positive Yelp ratings information and 5 A groups 
with negative Yelp ratings.  At the same time, B subgroup members visited a similar type 
of restaurant in Chandler, AZ for lunch (rated 4.0 stars on Yelp) following a similar 
procedure.  I also recruited 37 individuals as control group members who visited both the 
restaurants separately in stage 1 and stage 2 without any prior reviews or information 
about the restaurants.  These control group members were individually recruited 
following a random selection process in a popular shopping complex located near both 
restaurants.   
The primary data generated from this social dining experiment includes responses 
from 136 respondents for each of two restaurants.  I collected all reviews available on 
Yelp.com for both the restaurants and after evaluating these reviews by reading them all I 
only filtered those, which were clearly positive or clearly negative (table 1).  Based on 
Yelp reviews restaurant two in Chandler is more famous than restaurant one in Gilbert. I 
randomly compiled sets of five reviews for each positive and negative review types for 
both the restaurants.  This way I had two negative and two positive sets of reviews for the 
first restaurant in Chandler and six positive and three negative sets of reviews for the 
                                               
2 Primary connection is a direct connection between friends, secondary connection is a connection between 
an individual and her friend’s friend and tertiary connection is a connection between an individual and 
secondary connection’s friend. Also one of the 100 peer network members did not respond to the second 
stage survey but I was able to recover 99 peer responses for both stage 1 and stage 2. 
3 I carefully selected the restaurants and ensured that these two are open long enough to have sufficient 
Yelp reviews, yet still be unfamiliar to my respondents so that there is no past experience bias while rating 
or reviewing the restaurants.    
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second restaurant in Gilbert.  Again I randomly sent these sets of reviews to the 
corresponding positive and negative groups of respondents in stage one.      
Table-1 Yelp Reviews for Restaurants  
 
 
 
 
Total Review Count 
Filtered Review Type 
Count of Positive Reviews Count of Negative Reviews 
Restaurant-1 (Gilbert) 24 10 10  
Restaurant-2 (Chandler) 100 60 30 
 
After visiting the assigned restaurant in round one, each respondent was asked to 
provide a rating (on a scale of 1 – 5) on each of the following seven attributes of the 
restaurant experience: (1) taste of the food, (2) quality of the food, (3) availability of 
healthy menu choices, (4) ambience of the restaurant, (5) quality of the service, (6) price 
and (7) ease of locating the restaurant.  To proxy demand, and measure the influence of 
Yelp and peer reviews in my econometric model, I asked the respondents to rate (on a 
scale of 1-5) their likelihood to revisiting the restaurants and whether they would 
recommend a friend visit each restaurant.  At the end of the first stage all the respondents 
were asked to write a Yelp style review about their dining experiences.
4
  These reviews 
serve as peer reviews for the other subgroup in stage two.  
 I allowed approximately 10 days for each round to be completed and then a week 
to fill out the surveys.  The data was collected using an online survey service, Network-
Genie (https://secure.networkgenie.com).  While the stage one survey had five sections: 
                                               
4 I do not use Yelp star-rating system to compare peer and yelp reviews due to the problems associated with 
how the rating are defined as mentioned by Anderson and Magruder (2012).     
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demographic information, behavioral information, network information, eating out 
preferences and stage one restaurant experience; stage two  has only one section, 
gathering data on the nature of each respondent’s restaurant experience.  In the behavioral 
information section, I asked respondents about their online activity level, involvement 
with online social media (both anonymous and peers networking websites) and use of 
online social media as a product/service information tool.   
In the network information section, I asked respondents to rate all the peers in 
their network on a scale of 1-5 based on how well they do they know other members in 
their network.  This way, I obtained a full 10×10 social adjacency matrix for each peer 
network (Appendix-1).  
Members in a peer group are connected to each through primary, secondary or a 
tertiary connection with other members in their group.  In a peer network, if a member is 
familiar with another member in the same group that is considered as a primary 
connection.  If two members, A and B, in a peer network don’t know each other directly 
but have a common friend C,  then the connection between A and B is deemed a 
secondary connection.  Similarly, there can be various tiers of connections within a peer 
network.  I allowed multiple connection tiers while recruiting the peer groups as network 
intransitivity may strongly affect the quality of the peer-effect estimates (Bramoullé, 
Djebbari and Fortin, 2009).  Due to the presence of network intransitivity in peer 
networks, peer effects will likely include direct effects, generated from primary 
connections as well as indirect effects, generated from secondary, tertiary or higher 
degree connections.  Transitivity is a sufficient condition but not a necessary condition 
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for indirect effects.  To fully understand the peer network dynamics it is important to 
understand direct as well as indirect network effects. 
The resulting sample is broadly representative of the general population.  The 
mean age of my sample is 37.27 years.  Interestingly, 95 percent of the respondents have 
recommended a new restaurant to their peers and 80 percent of all respondents have used 
online reviews in the past.  Respondents with some college degree/trade school (non-
bachelor and non-master degree) and bachelor’s degree were the two most prevalent 
groups in the sample (figure-3).  In the sample 69 percent respondents had an annual 
income between $25,000 and $125,000 (figure-4).  
 
        Figure-3, Educational Distribution  
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Figure-4, Annual Income Distribution  
 
 There is a representation of 7 ethnic groups in my sample, in which the 71 percent 
population is predominantly white.  The second largest ethnic group is, Asian (figure 5). 
In the sample there is a proportionate share of four online leisure activity groups from  
Figure-5, Ethnic Group Representation   
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high online activity group, who spends more than two hours online per day to low online 
activity group who spend less than 30 minutes daily on the web (figure 6).      
Figure-6, Non-work Online Time Spent (Hours per Day)  
 
 
 Crosstabulation on overall rating by restaurant shows that positive reviews have a 
positive impact and the negative reviews have a negative impact on overall rating for the 
both the restaurants with just one exception of negative review impact on second 
restaurant rating which is 3.79 with a standard deviation of 1.44 (table 2).  By comparing 
different scenarios in the crosstabulation the effect of positive and negative reviews as  
Table-2, Average Overall Rating (Standard Deviation) Cross Tabulation  
 Positive  Control Negative 
 Round-1 Round-2 Round-1 Round-2 Round-1 Round-2 
Restaurant 1 3.72 
(1.4) 
3.4583 
(1.31807) 
3.6111 
(1.24328) 
3.6316 
(1.16479) 
3.5 
(1.10454) 
3.4583 
(1.21509) 
Restaurant 2 3.7917 
(1.14129) 
3.76 
(1.05198) 
3.4737 
(1.21876) 
3.7778 
(1.11437) 
3.7917 
(1.444) 
4.1538 
(1.04661) 
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well as the effect of anonymous and peer reviews can be seen but a further econometric 
estimation is required to test the hypothesis.       
 I cross tabulate the likeliness to revisit the restaurants (table 3) for diners and find 
indication (unevenly distributed effect of peer reviews while comparing stage 2 peer and 
control reviews) that suggest, all peers might not have equal effect on others in the peer 
network and observe.  Further I suspect there exist various combinations of properties 
such influential positions in the network, stronger connections with other members, more 
central locations to the network,  frequent communication with other members for these 
influential members.  It may be the case that control groups in both the stages rate the 
restaurants differently than Yelp review groups or peer review groups. 
Table-3, Stage 1 and Stage 2 Data Summary for Overall Rating 
 
Rating 
(1-5 scale) 
Stage-1 Yelp Reviews Stage-2 Peer Reviews 
Negative 
(50) 
No Review  
(37) 
Positive 
(49) 
Total 
(136) 
No Reviews 
(37) 
Peer Reviews 
(99) 
Total 
(136) 
Overall 1.0 8.0% 5.4% 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2.0 6.0% 13.5% 22.4% 14.0% 16.2% 17.2% 16.9% 
3.0 38.0% 32.4% 26.5% 32.4% 32.4% 35.4% 34.6% 
4.0 10.0% 18.9% 4.1% 10.3% 16.2% 6.1% 8.8% 
5.0 38.0% 29.7% 46.9% 39.0% 35.1% 41.4% 39.7% 
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Chapter 4 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In this section, I describe two econometric models.  The first model compares the 
marginal impact of information obtained via anonymous networks on restaurant 
preference with the marginal effect of similar information obtained through peer 
networks.  The objective of this model is to find out which network has a greater impact 
on restaurant choice.  In this model, I use proximity as a measure of network 
connectedness.  Proximity is a commonly used measure in the social network studies to 
identify the relative location of individuals in a social network (Freeman 1979; 
Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz, 2010).  The second 
model tests whether negative reviews have a greater marginal impact (in absolute value) 
than positive reviews in determining restaurant preference.  Because my measure of 
preference is an ordinal ranking metric, an ordered probit framework is used throughout.  
I explain each model in turn.    
4.1 Anonymous versus Peer Networks  
 
I use a random coefficient ordered probit model to account for the ordinal nature of the 
rating data.  In this model, I use consumers’ assessment of the likelihood of revisiting 
each restaurant as a preference indicator.  Each respondent was asked to  rate the 
likelihood that they would revisit each restaurant on a 5 point Likert scale, each  response 
reflecting  their expected  utility from re-visiting the restaurant in question.  
 An ordered probit model estimates the probability of moving from one scale level 
to another. I use a 5 point Likert scale throughout the experiment for the sake of 
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simplicity as a 5 point Likert scale and a 7 point Likert scale provide comparable results 
(Dawes, 2008).  A consumer can rate his or her likelihood of revisiting the restaurant by 
selecting an integer value from 1 to 5 on a Likert scale.  Where 5 represents the 
maximum level of satisfaction and 1 represents the lowest level of satisfaction.  My two 
stage experiment generated 274 observations for 137 respondents.  This sample size and 
number of observations is appropriate to use a 5 point Likert scale (Hinkin, 1995).   
 I start with a general utility model for a subject i who belongs to a peer network j 
and goes to a restaurant k in round l. The utility of individual i is represented by uijkl.  
Instead of assuming that utility of an individual i, (i=1…..n) depends upon the mean 
rating provided by the peers in network j as in a more typical social-learning model 
(Duflo and Saez 2002, 2003), I follow a more general spatial approach. In this approach 
utility (uijkl) depends on the combination of, information provided about the restaurant k 
by the peers in network  j and the strength of the relationship of individual i with other 
peers in the network  j.   
Information about the restaurant provided by other members, in the network j is in 
the form of reviews and represented by y-i. Review information y-i is numerically coded 
on a 5 point Likert scale where 5 represents the highest level and 1 represents the lowest 
level rating.  The relationship among peers in a network j, is defined by an adjacency 
matrix G (appendix-1).  I ask all the members of the peer network to rate, how well they 
know their peers on a scale of 1-5.  This way for a peer group with n members I construct 
an n×n full relationship information matrix.  I call this matrix the adjacency matrix 
throughout.  Adjacency matrix G is constructed using each individual’s perception about 
his or her relationship strength with other peers in network j. If all the members in 
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network  j, know each other equally well and have equal strength connections among all 
the peers, this model becomes an average peer effect model as estimated by Sacerdote 
(2001), Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003). Utility (uijkl) also depends on the information 
provided by the anonymous reviewers on restaurant k, which is represented by Xkl and an 
iid random error term ij .          
u ijijkl     1 2Gy Xklij   (1) 
where each 1 and 2  are the parameters to be estimated.  I assume both parameters, 
including the peer effect coefficient, 1 , and the anonymous effect coefficient,2  are 
normally distributed such that q∼N q( , ). 
2
These parameters account for unobserved 
heterogeneity or variations in tastes which are not accounted for observed differences 
among individuals.  The results in my estimates do not suffer from the aggregation bias 
common in the past studies (Train, 2009).  I write the indirect utility model derived from 
the original utility model in matrix notation as below:  
Y Gy X    1 2    (2) 
Where Y, an n × 1 utility vector which represents indirect utility measured by the 
likelihood to revisit the restaurant. Matrix G is row normalized n × n, peer relationship 
matrix or the adjacency matrix (appendix 1). Vector y is an n×1 vector containing peer 
reviews for all the individuals. Term ε is the error term for the model.  
Estimating the model above assumes that each type of network effect is 
exogenous.  However, it is well understood that unobservables in each subject’s utility 
function are likely to be correlated with their location in the network.  Therefore, the 
ordered probit model above suffers from endogeneity bias a priori.  In order to correct 
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the model for endogeneity, I use a two-stage control function estimation method (Park 
and Gupta 2009; Petrin and Train 2010).  Define Gyij  in equation 1 as below: 
G = Zy ij  p e    (2) 
In equation 2 above Zp is an n × m matrix of instrumental variables where m is the 
number of instruments.  The instruments include respondents’ demographic and 
behavioral information such as age of the respondent, whether they consider peer reviews 
in decision making, whether they wrote any online reviews before, whether they check 
nutrient content before buying a food product, how important they think of taste as an 
attribute, interaction between age and gender and interaction between age and nutrient 
content consciousness.  The parameter vector   represents the marginal effect of each 
instrument on the endogenous peer effect.  I assess the validity of each instrument using 
the Wu test (1973) and Hausman test (1978).  I carefully test the instrumental variables 
that are likely to be correlated with the endogenous peer-effect, and yet mean 
independent of the error term in the estimating equation.  I gathered more than 25 
variables for this purpose and use the best after formally testing them in the next section.  
As I only estimate two parameters in the model, including these instruments are sufficient 
to identify all peer effects.  
In the first model, uijkl is unobserved utility but my model allows the respondents 
to choose from five possible responses, y on the bases of their utility level. The five 
different preference levels, represented by four cutoff points for the possible responses 
given by kp (where p=1, 2…4).  Using equation 1, with the ordered probit framework the 
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ordinal data representing consumer demand, y and the five levels of consumer utility, Ui 
are given by:  
y U k 5 1:  
y k U k  4 1 2:  
y k U k  3 2 3:  
y k U k  2 3 4:  
y k U 1 4:  
 The probability of consumer response y is given by Pq as below, where q =1, 2…5 
representing utility from the lowest to the highest level and  is the standard cumulative 
normal function. 
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 Using this model, I compare the absolute values of the two parameters: the 
parameter for the peer effects after the two stage endogeneity treatment and the 
anonymous effects parameter, 2 .  If the peer effects parameter is significantly smaller 
than the anonymous effects parameter, I reject my original hypothesis that peer 
recommendations have stronger effect than anonymous expert reviews and vice versa.        
4.2 Positive versus Negative Reviews  
 
In the second model I compare the effect of positive and negative reviews for anonymous 
Yelp reviews.  This model is also an ordered probit model because the dependent variable 
is the same as that used in the first model. 
My underlying hypothesis is that the utility index describing each respondent’s 
restaurant preferences is differentially affected by positive and negative reviews.  
Specifically, if the respondent’s utility function is concave with respect to the nature of 
information (see figure 2), then I expect the utility function to be “steeper” in a negative 
compared to a positive direction.  I test this hypothesis using a variant on the ordered 
probit model described above.  
I construct the following model using an ordered probit framework that compares  
positive and negative anonymous review effects.  Namely, utility is written as:  
   uijk i  3 4P N  (3) 
Where vector P represents positive reviews and vector N represents negative 
reviews.  Consumers are assumed to follow the same ordered-choice probit as that 
described above, so their choice reflects the ordinal choice that reflects the highest level 
of utility.  In terms of the estimated probability model, I write the estimating equation as:      
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   y i  3 4P N   (4) 
Where y  is the likelihood of revisiting the restaurant by respondent i.  The elements of 
each vector are constructed from the star ratings on each Yelp review where a star rating 
below average is deemed a “negative” review and an above average rating is defined as a 
“positive” review.  The vector  i  is the unobserved error term.                  
 Using this model, I test my second hypothesis of whether negative or positive 
reviews have stronger effect on restaurant choice.  Again in the second model I account 
for individuals’ heterogeneity by adding demographic and behavioral variables.  I 
compare the magnitude of coefficients 3 , which represents the effect of positive reviews 
and 4 , which represents the effect of negative reviews.  If the positive review coefficient 
is greater than the negative review coefficient, I reject my original hypothesis, that 
negative reviews can decrease the restaurant demand than positive reviews can increase 
it. 
  In the next chapter, I first formally test the null hypothesis that both peer 
networks and anonymous networks have no influence on restaurant choices.  Second, I 
test the validity of the instruments used in the first model. Then I test which network 
category: peer networks or anonymous networks, is more influential in restaurant choice.  
I test the first model using proximity, as a peer network location measure using the 
relationship adjacency matrix in appendix 1.
5
  Lastly I test, whether the positive or the 
negative reviews from anonymous sources can influence the demand of restaurants. 
                                               
5 Adjacency matrix is constructed according to the response of peers in a peer network by asking them how 
they perceive their relationship with other peers in the network (I asked: How well do you know ‘peer p’?). 
I measure this on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is the weakest relationship (do not know the individual) and 5 is 
the strongest relation (best friend)   
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Chapter 5 
RESULTS 
In this section, I present the results obtained from estimating the models described in the 
previous chapter.  Before presenting detailed results from testing each hypothesis, 
however, I conduct a battery of tests to establish the validity of my model.  I use cross 
tabulations for both stage 1 and stage 2.  My null hypothesis is that there is no Yelp effect 
in stage 1, and the second is that there is no peer effect in stage 2.  I test the null 
hypothesis by comparing the effect of Yelp reviews (stage-1) with the effect of peer 
reviews (stage-2) on the respondents (table 4) using chi-square tests for differences in 
mean.  I cross tabulate the overall experience rating provided by the diners with the  
Table-4 (Hypothesis Testing: Yelp and Peer effects) 
Cross-Tabulation   
( Overall Rating-Yelp/Peer  
Rating) 
Stage-1 (Yelp Effect) Stage-2(Peer Effect) 
 Chi-Square Value p-value Chi-Square Value p-value  
Pearson Chi-Square 15.647 .048** 76.359 .006* 
Likelihood Ratio 17.793 .023** 76.317 .006* 
**significant at 95 percent confidence  
Yelp and peer reviews they received in stage-1 and stage-2 respectively.  I found that 
both Yelp reviews and peer reviews have significant effects on the overall rating by the 
diners as p values for both Pearson Chi-squares and Likelihood ratios are less than 0.05 
(table 4).  Also I test the above mentioned hypothesis using the Wald test and found that 
both peer networks and anonymous networks have a significant effect on restaurant 
choice (-0.001 and -0.153 respectively) at 90 percent confidence (table 5).   
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Table-5, Hypothesis Test using Wald Statistics 
 Coefficient t-value 
Peer Network Effects -0.001** -2.06 
Anonymous Network Effects -0.153* -1.78 
  *Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%,   
 My first model compares the influence of peer reviews weighted by the 
connection strength among peers with anonymous Yelp reviews.  In this model I took 
respondents likelihood to revisit the restaurant as a measure of restaurant preference.  As 
discussed in the previous section to avoid the endogeneity bias and the reflection problem 
in peer network I run an OLS regression with the dependent variable, network proximity 
weighted peer reviews,Gyij . The results obtained by this OLS are presented in table 6. 
Table-6, Stage-1 OLS Regression with Instrument Variables 
Dependent Variable: Likeliness to Revisit Coefficient t-value p-value 
Age 0.0230** 2.08 0.039 
Consider Peer Review -1.245** -4.42 0.000 
Written Online Review 0.312** 2.64 0.009 
(Age × Gender)2 -0.051** -10.09 0.000 
Nutrient Consciousness -1.183** -3.77 0.000 
Taste as an Attribute 0.267** 3.24 0.001 
Age × Nutrient Consciousness 0.027** 3.16 0.002 
F value 30.5 
Hausman Test 47.87* 
Wu Test t-value 13.60* 
**Significant at 5%   
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I selected age of the respondent, whether they consider peer reviews in decision making, 
whether they wrote any online reviews before, whether they check nutrient content before 
buying a food product, how important they think of taste as an attribute, square of 
interaction between age and gender and interaction between age and nutrient content 
consciousness.
6
  To insure the validity of the instruments I perform Wu test (statistic = 
13.60) and Hausman test (statistic = 47.87) and found my instruments to be valid. Also 
the first stage instrument OLS model is significant with an F-value of 30.5. Also all seven 
variables are significant at 95 percent and have t-statistics larger than 1.96.   
 In my first model, I compare the anonymous network effects and the peer network 
effects on restaurant choice.  Instead of using network proximity weighted peer reviews,
Gyij , I use the residuals form the above estimated OLS to correct for endogeneity 
(Park and Gupta 2009; Petrin and Train 2010).  I estimate two models to compare the 
network effects; first model uses fixed coefficients for both peer and anonymous network 
effects, while the second model uses random parameters for both the networks. In both 
these models, I use likelihood of individuals to revisit the restaurants as the dependent 
variable, which is taken as a proxy to the restaurant choice.   
 The table 7 below presents the results obtained from the fixed parameter network 
effects comparison model.  The model converges at a log likelihood value, -422.87.  This 
model suggests that information from anonymous networks has a significant (t-statistic, -
1.78) impact at 90 percent confidence but the peer network effect is significant at 95 
                                               
6 I tested over 26 demographic and behavioral variables and selected the these three variables which quality 
as best instrument variables  
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percent confidence (t-statistic, │-2.06│>1.96). To account for individual heterogeneity, I 
included individuals’ preference for service, taste and healthy menu choices.  To validate 
the results from this model I test a random parameter model for both peer effects and 
anonymous effects.   
Table-7, Ordered Probit: Network Effects  
 
Dependent variable:  
Likelihood to Revisit 
Fixed Parameter 
Ordered Probit 
Random Parameter 
Ordered Probit 
Random Parameter 
O.P (Cholesky) 
Coefficien
t 
t-stat 
 
Coefficie
nt 
t-stat Coefficien
t 
t-stat 
 Treated Peer Effect -0.001** -2.06 
 
8.371** 2.94 0.568** 7.12 
Anonymous Effect -0.153* -1.78 
 
-3.815 -0.80 0.272** 3.02 
Preference for Service 0.235** 2.92 1.300** 4.84 1.300** 4.84 
Preference for Taste -0.013 -0.16 
 
3.414** -4.18 3.414** -4.18 
Pref. Healthy Choices 0.049 0.84 0.796** 4.65 0.796** 4.65 
Threshold 1 0.641** 9.67 
 
0.421** 6.37 0.421** 6.37 
Threshold 2 1.309** 18.03 
 
1.000** 17.55 1.000** 17.55 
Threshold 3 2.177** 22.73 1.872** 17.42 1.872** 17.42 
Log-likelihood -422.87 -444.80 
** Significant at 10% level, * Significant at 5% level  
 In the second network influence model, I allow both the peer network and 
anonymous network coefficients to be random following a normal distribution.  Probit 
models are well suited for incorporating random coefficients, provided the coefficients 
are randomly distributed (Hausman and Wise, 1978).  The results using a random 
coefficient model for both the networks are reported in table 7.  This model converges at 
a log likelihood value of 444.80. The log likelihood value suggests that the random 
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parameter model is better than the previous fixed parameter model.  The random 
parameter model indicates that only peer reviews influence consumer demand for 
restaurants as weighted peer reviews term (t statistic = 2.94) is statistically significant at a 
5% level, whereas anonymous review variable is insignificant (t statistic = -0.80).
7
  
Thresholds in both the models represent cut off points, which divide the utility 
distribution into five different parts in each model.  The coefficients in this model reflect 
the marginal effect imposed by information received from each peer networks and 
anonymous networks in restaurant choice.  These two models present conflicting results 
but in the fixed parameter model the signs of the coefficients are negative. The random 
parameter model suggests that peer effect is significant and hence stronger (coefficient of 
peer network effect, is larger 8.371) than that of anonymous effect, which is insignificant.  
 In this random parameter model, the standard deviation of anonymous effect 
random parameter is 0.40, whereas standard deviation of peer effect parameter is 0.58.  I 
also found that the correlation between these two random parameters is very high (-0.99).  
High correlation between these two parameters is undesirable, and may cause 
inconsistency in the model.  Hence I again estimate the model using Cholesky 
decomposition approach to correct for the correlation between the two random 
parameters similar to Natarajan, Nassar, and Chandrasekhar (2000).  Cholesky 
decomposition procedure is a valuable tool as it produces the most accurate results 
(McCullough, 1998).  Results from this model are presented in table 7.  Cholesky 
                                               
7
 I used 1000 points while conducting the simulation as suggested by Bhat (2001) and Train 
(2009) to ensure an appropriate value. 
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decomposition model corrects for the random coefficient correlation problem.  The 
Cholesky random parameter model indicates that both peer effects (t value = 7.12) and 
anonymous effects (t value = 3.02) are significant.  This model also corrects the signs of 
coefficients as both coefficients have same positive signs.  The model also suggests that 
peer networks have stronger marginal effects than that of anonymous networks on 
restaurant choice as the coefficient of peer effects, 0.57 is greater than coefficient of 
anonymous effects, 0.27.    
 Interestingly, above models show that, on average, peer reviews have significant 
and strong effects on restaurant choice, while anonymous reviews have significant but 
weaker effect on restaurant choice.  I compare the partial effects for both anonymous and 
peer networks in table 8 below.  As estimates of my network comparison model are 
highly correlated hence interpretation of partial effects with signs can be misleading.  I 
still present a partial effects table which gives a fair comparison between peer effects and 
anonymous effects in absolute terms.  At each five utility levels peer networks impose 
higher influence on restaurant demand reflected by the observed likelihood to revisit the  
Table-8, Network Comparison: Partial Effects 
Outcome (Revisit) Anonymous Networks Effects Peer Networks Effects 
Y = 0 0.025 -0.183 
Y = 1 -0.002 0.015 
Y = 2 -0.007 0.056 
Y = 3 -0.011 0.080 
Y = 4 -0.004 0.031 
 
restaurants.  Thus results support my original hypothesis that peer reviews are more 
influential than anonymous reviews.  Depth and variety in anonymous reviews and 
presence of a large pool of information are dominated by the trust and familiarity in the 
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peer networks.  At least this is true in the case of restaurant choice.  Peer networks are in 
general more trusted and hence likely overpower anonymous networks with unbiased 
information.         
 My second model compares the power of negative reviews and positive reviews 
and answers the question: Are positive reviews as beneficial as negative reviews are 
detrimental?  This model converges at a log likelihood value -234.93. The results in table 
9, show that both positive and negative reviews have significant impact on restaurant 
demand (measured by the likelihood to recommend a restaurant ) but negative reviews 
can damage the restaurant demand more than the positive reviews can improve (positive 
review coefficient 0.62 and negative review coefficient -0.79).  This result clearly 
supports the findings of Richards and Patterson (1999) and Chevalier and Mayzlin  
Table-9, Ordered Probit Model: Negative and Positive Reviews 
 
Dependent variable: 
Likelihood to Recommend 
 
Fixed Parameter Ordered Probit Random Parameter Ordered Probit 
Coefficient t-stat 
 
Coefficient t-stat 
Positive Reviews 0.624** 4.74 0.624** 3.18 
Negative reviews -0.790** -6.76 -0.790** -5.46 
Threshold 1 0.641** 9.67 
 
0.430** 5.78 
Threshold 2 1.309** 18.03 
 
0.886** 9.48 
Threshold 3 2.177** 22.73 1.865** 14.19 
Log-likelihood -234.934 
 
-238.049 
** Significant at 5% level, 
(2006). To validate the results from this model I also estimate a random parameter model 
and found the exact coefficients for both negative and positive reviews which are both 
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significant (t statistic for negative reviews, │-5.46│>1.96 and t statistic for positive 
reviews 3.18 >1.96) with improved log likelihood ratio (-238.05). To sum, I found that 
peer networks are more influential than anonymous networks in the case of restaurant 
choice and negative reviews have more powerful impact than that of positive reviews in 
the case of anonymous networks. The next chapter concludes the study by discussing, 
contribution and implications of my thesis, possible weaknesses of the research and my 
thoughts on possible future research.     
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I compare two categories of social networks (anonymous and peer 
networks) in terms of their effect on restaurant preference.  I consider the proximity 
among individuals in their peer network, while comparing the effect of recommendations 
from one’s peers to those obtained from anonymous “experts” through Yelp.com.   I also 
compare negative and positive reviews and determine the relative effect of each on 
restaurant preference.  I use a controlled, experimental approach in order to address the 
reflection problem (Manski 1993) that typically bedevils inference in empirical problems 
of social learning.   
 My experiment consists of two stages using real online anonymous restaurant 
reviews from Yelp.com and peer reviews from multiple peer groups to compare 
anonymous and peer networks.  In the first stage I provide anonymous Yelp reviews, and 
in the second stage peer reviews and measure subjects’ preferences after each stage.    
Peer reviews are weighted by each subject’s location in the peer network.  These 
weights are constructed from adjacency matrices that reflect the proximity of each 
member to all others, where proximity is defined as how well each member knows the 
others.  I include an equal proportion of positive Yelp and negative Yelp review groups 
along with a proportionate number of control respondents to accurately measure the 
negative and positive effects of anonymous reviews.   
 I find that, though both peer as well as anonymous reviews are have a significant 
impact, peer reviews are more influential than anonymous reviews in determining 
consumer preferences.  I also find both negative and positive reviews can affect 
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preferences, but negative reviews can more adversely affect the demand than positive 
review can boost the demand for restaurants.  
 This research has many important implications for both future researchers as well 
as industry practitioners.  My research provides a framework to setup multistage social 
network experiments to perform economic research.  My research is the first of its kind to 
compare the most prevalent form of social networks in real as well as in the virtual world.  
A significant portion of advertising budget is lost because of poorly targeted advertising 
(Greenyer, 2004 and Iyer, Soberman, Villas-Boas 2005).  By more accurately targeting 
these expenditures to influential network members, much of this loss can be avoided.   
My study focuses on restaurants, but the results likely extend to similar industries such as 
hotels, local contractors, bars and amusement parks.  In each case, consumers face a high 
degree of prior uncertainty in consuming a multi-attribute good and are likely to turn to 
social media – whether populated by peers or anonymous experts – to resolve this 
uncertainty.  As the user activity and the online user base increase in the future, social 
media marketing will become even more important and collect an even larger proportion 
of marketing budget from the traditional advertising media.  The results of this research 
can help local small businesses who have a limited marketing budget and WOM plays 
even a more important in driving demand for their services.     
 There are also few limitations of this research. Firstly the small size of peer 
groups can be a limiting factor for any controlled social-networking experiment.  On a 
practical level, however, it is challenging to conduct a multi stage experiment with larger 
groups, but future research with the involvement of lager peer groups will be a significant 
contribution to the literature.  
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            Future research should expand the idea of comparing anonymous network effects 
with peer network effects in other high involvement categories such as durable home 
appliances, automobile, medical care, holiday packages, house purchases and education 
investments.   Anonymous network effect studies which include attributes of reviewers, 
review characteristics and dynamic changes in reviews in terms of importance over time 
will enrich the existing social network literature.            
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 Network Member (Peer) 
Network Member (Peer) A B C D 
A _ 2 3 4 
B 2 _ 1 2 
C 3 1 _ 0 
D 4 1 0 _ 
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